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Abstract—This paper presents a game theoretic decen-
tralized electric vehicle charging schedule for minimizing
the customers’ payments, maximizing the grid efficiency,
and providing maximum potential capacity for ancillary
services. Most of the available methods for electric vehicle
charging assume that the customers are rational, there is
low-latency perfect two-way communication infrastructure
without communication/computation limitation between the
distribution company and all the customers, and they have
perfect knowledge about the system parameters. To avoid
these strong assumptions and preserve the customers’
privacy, we take advantages of the regret matching and the
Nash Folk theorems. In the considered game, the players
(customers) interact and communicate locally with only
their neighbors. We propose a mechanism for this game
which results in a full Nash Folk theorem. We demonstrate
and prove that the on-off charging strategy provides maxi-
mum regulation capacity. However, our mechanism is quite
general, takes into account the battery characteristics and
degradation costs of the vehicles, provides a real time
dynamic pricing model, and supports the vehicle-to-grid
(V2G) and modulated charging protocols. Moreover, the
developed mechanism is robust to the data disruptions and
takes into account the long/short term uncertainties.
Index Terms—Plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), decentral-
ized charging, Nash Folk strategy, regret matching.
I. INTRODUCTION
PLUG-IN electric vehicles (PEVs) will soon electrify theentire structure of the future transportation systems [1].
Reducing dependency on fossil fuels, reducing emissions of
greenhouse gases, energy and cost-saving, and better utilizing
of renewable energy sources are among the leading reasons
that PEVs are increasing in popularity. However, uncoordi-
nated charging of PEVs could have adverse effects on reliabil-
ity, stability, and efficiency of the power system. These adverse
effects include increasing the system peak load or creating
new sub-peaks, increasing power losses, decreasing the load
factor, and causing system voltage deviation and overloading
of transformers [2]. So, it is critical to develop a well-designed
charging coordination mechanism to alleviate the undesirable
effects and enhance the benefits of this electrification. From
this point of view, several studies have been carried out in
recent years to provide optimal charging schedules for PEVs
[3]–[14].
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A. Related Works
The authors of paper in [3] identified and analyzed the
relationships and the mutual influence between the feeder
losses, the load factor, and the load variance parameters.
They developed optimal charging algorithms for each of the
parameters, while minimizing the impact of PEV charging on
the connected distribution system. They denoted by the simu-
lation results on the two test systems that these relationships
approximately hold independent of system topology. Further,
they showed that it is more beneficial in terms of problem
convexity and the computational complexity to use load factor
or load variance as the objective function rather than system
losses. He et al. introduced a global convex optimization
problem in [4], which aimed to minimize the total cost for
charging all the PEVs within the day. As the proposed global
optimal solution needs information about the future base loads
and the arrival times and the charging periods of the PEVs that
will arrive in the future time of the day, it is impractical in
real world. So, they assigned a local optimization problem to
the PEVs scheduling in each local group, which is resilient to
the dynamic PEV arrivals and aims to minimize the total cost
of the PEVs in the current ongoing groups in an independent
and distributed manner. They demonstrated by the numerical
simulations that the locally optimal scheduling scheme can
achieve a close performance compared to the globally optimal
scheduling scheme.
The work in [5] formulated a game theoretical model to
characterize the interactions among the PEVs and the aggre-
gator in a V2G protocol. Using this model, the authors of
this paper designed a mechanism to achieve optimal frequency
regulation performance in a distributed fashion which benefits
both the customers and the power grids. To encourage the
PEVs to participate in the frequency regulation service, a
dynamic pricing policy is considered in this paper. Moreover,
they provided a new model explaining how a backup battery
bank can be deployed in an aggregator to maintain a stable
regulation capacity. Through analyzing the Nash equilibrium
in the vehicle-to-aggregator interaction games, they showed
that the proposed decentralized mechanism works as efficiently
as the centralized controlled methods. Reference [6] formu-
lated a decentralized iterative algorithm to schedule the PEV
charging to fill the valleys of the aggregated load demand
curve, which results in a valley-filling charging profile. In each
iteration, PEVs update their charging profiles according to the
control signal broadcast by the utility company, and the utility
company alters the control signal to guide their updates. This
procedure makes possible of real-time implementation and
tracking a desirable given load profile. The proposed method
preserves optimality (i.e., make the aggregate demand as flat
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as it can possibly be) even when the PEVs do not necessarily
update their charging profiles in every iteration. The proposed
algorithm in this work only requires each PEV solving its local
problem, hence its implementation requires low computation
capability.
A distributed algorithm for charging control of PEVs was
proposed in [7] based on the regret minimization, while the
utility functions of various PEV owners are not identical, or
precisely known to the distribution company. This algorithm
requires only one-way communication from the distribution
company to the customers, does not require infrastructure that
can support low latency two-way communication, and there
is no need for the customers to send their private data to the
distribution company. However, the charging profiles in this
work are sought to be optimized over the set of profiles that
do not vary from day to day, while the algorithm convergence
to the optimal charging schedule is slow. Based on the non-
cooperative game theory, a new price-driven charging control
scheme was developed in [8] to coordinate large scale PEVs
without compromising the security of the distribution network.
The aim of this work is to minimize the cost of individual PEV
owners, considering the overload constraints in the distribution
feeders which is tested on the IEEE 13-bus system. A Newton-
type fixed point method was formulated in this work to find
a better Nash equilibrium of the game model at a superlinear
convergence rate. Furthermore, an accelerated gradient method
was proposed to tackle the sub-problem for each customer’s
best response which is implemented in a distributed way in
order to protect customer’s privacy.
The impact of the PEVs demand on the system electricity
price was studied in [9]. The optimal scheduling of the individ-
ual PEV controller considering the actions of other PEVs in the
game is developed with the PEV driving pattern distribution.
An aggregative game model was proposed by this paper for
modeling interaction between the PEVs during the day-ahead
charging management. An optimization method is developed
to calculate the equilibrium of the game model through
quadratic programming and the existence and uniqueness of
its pure strategy Nash equilibrium was proved using Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions. Case studies with
the proposed game model were carried out using real world
driving data from the Danish National Travel Surveys. The
impacts of the PEV driving patterns and price forecasts on
the EV demand with the proposed game model were also
analyzed in this work. In [10], Liu et al. provided an online and
near-optimal dynamic stochastic linear programming scheme
to optimize electric vehicle recharging costs and increase
the reliability of system taking into account load, electricity
pricing, and renewable energy generation uncertainties. At first
offline stage of this work, a day-ahead problem is solved.
Subsequently, at the second online stage, the proposed frame-
work uses offline solutions, collects real-time system data,
and the stochastic market parameters, and adjusts recharging
schedules to obtain a better recharging scheme once system
uncertainties are revealed. Since the aggregator communicates
to each PEV only once, their method needs a low bandwidth
communication infrastructure and can be used in a wide area.
Further, the proposed method is robust to variations in different
stochastic parameters and benefits both users and the power
utility.
In another research [11], an optimal PEV charging schedule
has been formulated assuming that the deriving pattern and
future charging demand of the PEVs are not known a priori,
but their statistical information can be estimated. The cost
of PEV charging was defined as a general strictly convex
increasing function of the instantaneous load demand, and was
demonstrated that minimizing such a cost leads to a flattened
load demand. This problem was formulated as a finite-horizon
dynamic programming and a model predictive control (MPC)
was provided to avoid the prohibitively high complexity of
solving such a problem. The computational complexity and
performance gap between the near optimal solution of the
MPC-based approach and the optimal solution for any dis-
tributions of exogenous random variables where rigorously
analyzed in this paper. An optimal charging problem of the
PEVs on demand side management (DSM) was formulated in
[13] to meet the power system interests, such as reducing the
generation supply cost, while respecting each PEV’s charging
constraint. A distributed consensus initialization-free algo-
rithm was used in this work to estimate the mismatch between
all the PEVs allocated powers and the total available charging
power on the directed graph. With these mismatch estimation,
a non-smooth analysis-based dynamic system was adopted by
the authors to dynamically update the PEVs charging power.
The proposed multi-agent system strategy is robust to the time-
varying available charging power, plug-and-play operations,
and single-link failures. Wang et al. in [14], introduced a
hybrid two-stage centralized-decentralized charging control
scheme to reduce the energy cost and guarantee the system sta-
bility. On the centralized stage, an offline optimal scheduling
approach was presented aiming at minimizing the energy cost
while satisfying the charging requirements of the PEVs. To
deals with the system dynamics and uncertainties, a real time
MPC-based adaptive scheduling strategy is developed by the
authors to determine the near optimal PEV charging profiles.
Then, on the decentralized stage, the interactions between
the PEVs and the charging system controller is modeled as
a leader-follower non-cooperative Stackelberg game in which
the system controller acts as the leader and the PEVs act as
followers. It was shown in this work that by adopting the pro-
posed decentralized charging algorithm, the communication
burden between PEVs and the system controller is low and the
charging scheme is robust to poor communication channels.
B. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
Designing a novel fully decentralized game theoretic
model: Due to the interdependence between PEVs’ actions
(a PEV action affects other PEVs’ payoffs), a game theoretic
model for the PEVs charging is designed guarantying the
local optimality for each PEV and the global optimality for
the system aggregator. As the centralized coordination of
large fleet of PEVs is costly, not secure, not reliable, and
complex process, a fully decentralized scalable approach is
proposed for the first time and its convergence to the Nash Folk
equilibrium is proved. In the developed framework, the inter-
actions between PEVs are done locally with neighbors using
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an arbitrary-private topology. So, the privacy of the customers
are preserved, there is not any vulnerable central point, and
the framework is robust to link/node failures. Further, unlike
the game theoretic solutions in the literature which do not
consider the adversary customers and malfunction data, any
customer action deviation or cyber-attack can be identified in
the proposed framework. In the mean time, as the emergence
of PEVs to the system affects the electricity market price, we
formulate a dynamic real time pricing policy in which the
customers take into account their impacts on the price.
Improving long/short term global performance: Due to the
several uncertainty sources (e.g., unexpected plug-in/out the
PEVs, base load, and baseline price) the day-ahead schedul-
ing solution may get away from the optimal point. So, we
adjoin the regret matching strategy (to improve the long term
performance) and the MPC strategy (to improve the short
term performance) with our framework. We also use Bayesian
inference and conditional value at risk techniques to tackle
the uncertainties in driving behaviors of the customers. Beside
considering the customers’ payments and battery degradation
costs, the proposed method results in a valley-filling charging
profile, minimizes the power losses and the load variance, and
maximizes the load factor and total regulation capacity.
Supporting universal charging protocols: Charging the
PEVs with faster rate and lower time by drawing the maximum
charging power from the charging pole [12], prolonging the
PEV battery’s lifetime with constant power feeding [15],
and requiring smaller communication overheads to contact
(switch off or on) with a small subset of PEVs [16]. Further,
with this method the infrastructures only need to work with
one charging rate which needs very cheap infrastructure and
services. In addition to the desirable effects of on-off charging
strategy, rather than modulating the charging rate, we prove
that the on-off strategy results in providing the maximum
regulation capacity. However, our proposed method supports
the modulated and V2G charging protocols too.
The proposed real-time universal charging scheduling im-
plemented in the fully decentralized manner have potential
application in the large power systems with too many cus-
tomers and the micro-grids equipped with the renewable power
generation similar to work in [17]. The model considered in
this paper is completely general and can be implemented by
different residential/commercial/industrial/organizational cus-
tomers having one or a group of the PEVs with some minor
manipulations.
Notation: Throughout the paper |·| denotes the cardinality of
the corresponding set, Pr{·} denoted the probability operator,
E[·] denotes the expectation operator, [a]+ = max{0, a}, and
〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product. For λ-strongly convex function
L(x) with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖, ‖ · ‖∗ denotes the norm that
is dual to ‖·‖. We denote the Bregman divergence with respect
to L(x) as DL(x, x´) := L(x)− L(x´)− 〈∇L(x´), x− x´〉, and
∇L−1(x) denotes the inverse mapping of gradient ∇L(x).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system
components is described in Section II. The PEV energy
consumption scheduling problem is formulated in Section III.
Our proposed method is introduced in Section IV. Section
V provides simulation results and we conclude the paper in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In liberalized electricity markets, the retailers buy electricity
from the wholesale market and sell it to their customers
in a way to maximize social welfare [18]. Besides, in the
liberalized ancillary service market, to facilitate PEVs par-
ticipation and satisfy the minimum regulation capacity (e.g.,
0.1 MW), the aggregators are served as an interface between
the independent system operator (ISO) and a fleet of PEVs
[12]. The more the PEVs can provide regulation capacity, the
more they can acquire financial rebate. On the day before the
operation hours, each PEV owner determines the amount of
regulation capacity which can or is willing to provide. The
aggregator gathers all the regulation capacities and submits
its bid to the ISO accordingly. In one hand, the retailer must
announce the total future load demand of its customers to
the wholesale market before starting the scheduling horizon
H (e.g., one day with H = 24 hours). This load profile is
needed by the wholesale market for energy management and
power balancing issues. On the other hand, the aggregator
has to sign a contract with the ISO based on the expected
storage capacity of its associated PEV fleet before starting
the scheduling horizon. So, it is necessary for the retailer
(aggregator) to determine a proper framework to reduce the
customers’ payment (increase the PEVs regulation capacity)
in a day-ahead manner1.
A. Constraints
Consider set K of PEVs belonging to different residential
customers subscribing to the same aggregator. By assuming
that each customer has one PEV, the number of the PEVs
(customers) is denoted with K = |K|. As the most energy
consumption schedules are implemented in two stages (first
day ahead programing and then real time programing), we
divide a scheduling horizon H into several time slots H ,
[1, 2, · · · , H]. The PEVs are schedulable only when they are
at home and plugged into the power system. So, there is a
schedulable window Hk , [αk, · · · , βk] ⊆ H for each PEV
k, where αk is the plugged in time and βk is the last time
slot after which the PEV leaves the house. Let xhk denote the
power rate at which PEV of customer k ∈ K is charged (xhk >
0) or discharged (xhk < 0) at slot h ∈ H (i.e., the energy
consumption at each slot). Also, the total inelastic (non-PEV)
load demand of the customer in slot h is denoted with lhk .
To coordinate charging process of the PEV’s battery of each
customer the following constraints must be satisfied:
Eh+1k = E
h
k + ηk
xhk
Bcapk
, Emink ≤ Ehk ≤ Emaxk , ∀h ∈ H (1)
∑
h∈Hk
ηk
xhk
Bcapk
= Edk , x
h
k = 0, ∀h /∈ Hk (2)
where Ehk is the state of charge (SOC) of PEV k at slot
h, ηk ∈ (0, 1] is the energy conversion efficiency of charg-
ing/discharging, Bcapk [kWh] is the maximum energy that the
battery can store (storage capacity), Emink is the lower bound
1Throughout the paper, we assume that both the retailer and ag-
gregator are the same entity and the terms “retailer, aggregator” and
“customer, PEV owner” are used interchangeably.
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of the battery’s SOC, Emaxk is the upper bound of the battery’s
SOC, and Edk is the desired SOC at the end of scheduling
horizon H . The first term of (1) is the dynamic equation of
the battery’s SOC, and the second implies that the SOC of
each battery is bounded. For example, we can let Emink = 0%
and Emaxk = 100%. That means, the battery is allowed to
be depleted in discharging mode and can be charged to the
rated capacity. The first term of (2), imposes the scheduling
program to provide the required energy level for PEV’s traffic
at the departure time (end of the scheduling horizon), and
the second term denotes that when the PEV is unplugged,
it cannot consume power. So, the feasible set for PEV k’s
charging schedule is defined as:
Xk := {xk | (1) and (2)} (3)
where xk , [x1k, · · · , xHk ] and each charging schedule is
acceptable if and only of xk ∈ Xk.
B. Price Function
In the proposed strategies in the demand response (DR)
literature, the price signals are used as the main tool to shape
the load demand curve [19]. To make an optimal decision
in these strategies, the customers need to forecast the price
parameters before the scheduling horizon. However, most of
the strategies assume that the customers are price-taker (PT)
[20]. That means, the behavior of the active (who participate
in the DR programs) customers does not affect the wholesale
price signal. However, when there are a considerable number
of active customers (e.g., PEVs) in the grid, their power
consumption behavior will be comparable to the conventional
demand and inevitably influence the spot prices in the day-
ahead market. So, in this paper, the PEVs are considered to
be price-participant (PP), meaning that, they consider their
action’s impact on the spot price signal coming from the
retailer. To do this, the predicted price at slot h is modeled as
follows:
Ph = ph + λh
∑
k∈K
xhk (4)
where ph is the foretasted baseline price at slot h due to
the inelastic demand and λh
∑
k∈K x
h
k is incurred price (say
spot price) due to the flexible demand with price sensitivity
coefficient λh [9].
C. Cost Function
The most important purpose of each PEV owner to par-
ticipate in the charging schedule is reducing his payment as
much as possible. However, frequent charging/discharging the
PEV’s battery to reduce the payment, also reduces the battery’s
lifetime. Considering appropriate storage and operation cost
functions can be interpreted as imposing a soft constraint to
prolong the lifetime preventing large variations of the stored
energy. As the lithium-ion type of battery, has been widely
applied in electrical vehicles [21], we define the following cost
function for customer k incorporating the lithium-ion battery
degradation cost:
fk(xk) =
∑
h∈H
Ph(xhk + lhk)+ φsk + φfk (5)
where
φsk =
∑
h∈H
(
γs1k (x
h
k)
2 + γs2k |xhk |+ γs3k
)
, φfk =
H∑
h=2
γfk
(
xhk − xh−1k
)2
,
γs1k = 10
6pcelγ4/(MkV
nom), γs2k = 10
3pcel(γ2 + γ6V nom),
γs3k = Mkp
celV nom(γ1 + γ3V nom + γ5(V nom)2 + γ7(V nom)3)
(6)
where pcel represents the price of a single energy unit of a
battery cell, Mk is the number of cell units in PEV k, and
V nom is the nominal value of the open circuit voltage of
the battery cell unit [22]. The parameters γi, i = 1, 2, · · · , 7
specified as −1.148 × 10−7, 3.9984 × 10−8, 1.3158 × 10−7,
5.5487 × 10−10, −4.968 × 10−8, −1.1166 × 10−8, and
6.1675×10−9, respectively [21]. For a detailed analyze about
the battery degradation cost please refer to [23]. The first
term of (5) is the monetary cost imposed on customer k
due to buying power xhk for his PEV and buying power l
h
k
for his inelastic (non-PEV) appliances in price Ph at slot h.
The terms φsk, φ
f
k in (5) define the battery degradation cost
due to the variations of the stored energy (storage cost) and
frequent fluctuations of charging/discharging power (operation
cost) with model parameter γs1k , γ
s2
k , γ
s3
k , and γ
f
k determined
by the battery manufacturer (higher weights γs1k , γ
s2
k , and
γfk encourage smaller variation with the constant per slot
storage price γs3k ), respectively. Clearly, if the PEV power
consumption does not change in some consecutive time slots,
there is no operation cost φfk for that slots [4].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Tackling The Uncertainties
In general, the actual plug-in time αk, plug-out time βk,
and the desired energy level (SOC) for the next trip Edk (i.e.,
the driving pattern) of each PEV k may not be available
to its corresponding customer in advance. To tackle these
uncertainty resources, the customer can collect the plug-in-
plug-out and the desired energy demand historical data record
of each PEV k. According to the collected driving pattern
data, one can estimate the energy demand (EˆdkB
cap
k ) and
the probabilities piα,k(h) and piβ,k(h) in which the PEV
k becomes available and unavailable at each time slot h,
respectively. The conditional probability piα,k(h|τ) that the
PEV k becomes available in an upcoming time slot h > τ ,
given that it has not become available until the current time
slot τ , is [24]:
piα,k(h|τ) = piα,k(h)
1−∑τh´=1 piα,k(h´) (7)
The conditional probability piβ,k(h|τ) that the PEV k be-
comes unavailable at slot h, given that it is still available at
the current slot τ , can be drawn in a similar way. Bayes’
theorem allows us to update prior beliefs on the probabilities
piα,k(h|τ) and piβ,k(h|τ) at each slot h [25]. Due to the
adaptive nature of our framework, from the point of view
of Bayesian inference, one can estimate the values of αk
and βk using the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP)
estimate techniques [26]. In estimating the desired SOC Edk ,
if we underestimate the energy demand, high discomfort level
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would impose on the PEV owner k and it is possible that the
PEV’s task remain unfinished. The smart conditional value-
at-risk (CVaR)-based regularizer turns out to be capable of
utilizing the PEVs cabability intelligently for peak shaving and
ancillary service effectively with limited underestimate risk
[27]. To prevent the under-estimation (i.e., the energy deficit
for the PEV), the customer k is charged with shortage price
Psh (cents/kW), when its actual energy demand is higher than
the estimated amount. Let ∆k(Edk , Eˆ
d
k) = Psh[Edk − Eˆdk ]+
denote the penalty for energy deficit imposed on the customer
k for one scheduling window, where Eˆdk is the estimated
desired SOC. Under a given confidence level νk ∈ (0, 1)
and the estimated energy demand Eˆdk , the value-at-risk (VaR)
for PEV k is defined as the minimum threshold cost σk, for
which the probability of energy shortage of PEV k being
less than σk is at least νk. Due to the non-convexity, it is
difficult to minimize the VaR. The CVaR is an alternative risk
measure, which is convex and can be optimized using sampling
techniques [27]. The CVaR, CV νk (Eˆ
d
k), for PEV k is defined
as the expected value of the energy deficit cost, ∆k(Edk , Eˆ
d
k),
when only the costs that are greater than or equal to the VaR,
V νk (Eˆ
d
k), are considered [27]. That is,
V νk (Eˆ
d
k) = min{σk|Pr{∆k(·) ≤ σk} ≥ νk},
CV νk (Eˆ
d
k) = E
[
∆k|∆k(·) ≥ V νk (Eˆdk)
]
(8)
It is possible to estimate the CVaR by adopting sample average
approximation (SAA) technique [28]. Samples of the random
variable Edk for PEV k can be observed from the historical
record. Consider the set Ek = {1, 2, · · · , Ek} of Ek samples
of the random variable Edk . Let E
d
k,n denote the n
th sample
of Edk for PEV k. The CVaR in (9) can be approximated by
[29]:
CV νk (Eˆ
d
k) ≈ min
σk
C˜νk (Eˆ
d
k , σk),
C˜νk (Eˆ
d
k , σk) = σk +
∑
n∈Ek
[∆hk(E
d
k,n, Eˆ
d
k)− σk]+
Ek(1− νk) (9)
Under the given estimate Eˆdk , we can use the historical samples
of the PEV’s desired energy demand in each scheduling
window to compute C˜νk (Eˆ
d
k , σk). Moreover, according to the
MPC theory, we can use the information updated at each slot
to improve the performance of the estimation [30].
B. The global optimization problem
From the aggregator point of view, the total load profile
must be as flat as possible (valley filling) and the PEVs should
be managed so that they provide maximum regulation capacity
to reduce the power system losses and increase the efficiency.
On the other hand, the customers only care about their
payment. We provide a mechanism to make a compromise
between the two. The global optimization problem to minimize
the customers’ payments is given by:
min
xk∈Xk
∑
k∈K
(∑
h∈H
((
ph + λh
∑
k∈K
xhk
)(
xhk + l
h
k
)
+ γs1k (x
h
k)
2 +
γs2k |xhk |+ γs3k
)
+
H∑
h=2
γfk
(
xhk − xh−1k
)2)
(10)
This problem is a strictly convex due to its combination of
strictly convex and linear functions [31]. We can solve problem
(10) centrally by the aggregator using well known convex
programming techniques. However, due to the mentioned
drawbacks of the centralized solutions (in Section I-B), we
seek to provide a decentralized solution. In Section V of
[5] it is shown that under some conditions, the decentralized
game theoretic solution (Nash equilibrium) coincides with
the optimal global centralized solution. In the decentralized
strategy, each customer is aware only of his personal objective
function and constraints. With some manipulation the global
problem (10) is rewritten as follows:
min
xk∈Xk
∑
k∈K
∑
h∈H
(
λh
∑
k∈K
xhk
)(
xhk + l
h
k
)
+
∑
k∈K
∑
h∈H
ph
(
xhk + l
h
k
)
+
∑
k∈K
∑
h∈H
γs1k (x
h
k)
2 + γs2k |xhk |+ γs3k +
H∑
h=2
γfk
(
xhk − xh−1k
)2
(11)
The challenging term for decentralizing the problem is the
first term which shows that the optimal behavior of each
customer depends on how he/she and all other customers
schedule their consumptions. So, due to the dynamic price
component λh
∑
k∈K x
h
k , the customers’ actions are coupled
to each other through an energy cost sharing model. The
most suitable solution concept to tackle such energy cost
sharing model is achieved through game theory. Each game
Γ(K, xk, Pk(xk, x−k)) is defined by three components as:
Players: All the registered customers in set K. Strategies:
Charging/discharging schedules xk of each player k ∈ K.
Payoffs: Local objective function Pk(xk, x−k) that each player
k seeks to maximize it. Let’s define the local cost function
associated with each single customer k ∈ K as follows:
min
xk∈Xk
Jk(xk, x−k) =
∑
h∈H
((
λh
(
xhk +
∑
j∈K/k
xhj
))(
xhk + l
h
k
)
+
ph
(
xhk + l
h
k
)
+ γs1k (x
h
k)
2 + γs2k |xhk |+ γs3k
)
+
H∑
h=2
γfk
(
xhk − xh−1k
)2
(12)
where x−k denotes all the customers’ action other than that
of customer k. The payoff function of customer k becomes
Pk(xk, x−k) = −Jk(xk, x−k). The dynamic price component
is decomposed accordingly to customer k’s dynamic cost and
the other customers (j ∈ K/k) as λh(xhk +∑j∈K/k xhj ).
Theorem 1. An optimal solution of (11) provides a valley
filling load profile, minimizes the load variance, minimizes the
power system losses, and maximizes the load factor.
Proof. See Appendix A.
0278-0046 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIE.2018.2853609, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Electronics
In view of Theorem 1, as the proposed framework has the
lowest load variance and results in a valley filling charging
profile, there is no need to be concerned about additional
constraint that may refrain from equipment’s overloading.
Theorem 2. An optimal on-off strategy with maximum charge
rate xrk for convex minimization problem (12) maximizes the
regulation capacity.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Based on Theorem 2, the charging control should be on
or off at the maximum charging rate to maximize regulation
capacity. Thus, there is no need to be concerned about the opti-
mal charging rate and constraints such as xmink ≤ xhk ≤ xmaxk .
The only important thing is how to schedule the charging
sequence. So, the power consumption is constrained to be off
(xhk = 0) or on (x
h
k = x
r
k) and the feasible set Xk for each
PEV owner k ∈ K is modified as follows:
X˜k = {xk | (1), (2), and xhk ∈ {0, xrk}} (13)
where xrk is the rated power at which the PEV k is charged
(> 0) or discharged (< 0).
IV. NASH FOLK REGRET-BASED STRATEGY
The system parameters, such as, the price signal, the base
loads, the deriving patterns, and the customer’s decisions can
have unpredictable changes. So, there is always a difference
between the real world and the scheduled energy consump-
tions. This difference results in a sub-optimal schedule, even
with deploying the MPC and stochastic methods. Assuming
perfect knowledge of the parameters’ behavior throughput the
scheduling horizon is very strong. Therefore, we adopt the
optimistic mirror descent (OMD) regret-based algorithm to
take into account the long term behavior of these unpredictable
changes. The iterative minimization of problem (12) for each
k ∈ K based on the OMD algorithm becomes:
ψt+1k = ∇L−1k
(∇Lk(ψtk)− ηk∇J tk(xtk, xt−k))
xt+1k = arg min
xk∈X˜k
ηkx>kM
t+1
k +DLk(xk, ψ
t+1
k ) (14)
where superscript t denotes the problem at hand in day t,
ηk is a penalty term, Lk is any 1-strongly convex function,
and M t+1k denotes prediction for the gradient of the cost
function J t+1k . For example, we can select the prediction
M t+1k as the average of the gradients of the cost functions
for the previous days, i.e., M t+1k = 1/t
∑t
v=1∇Jvk (xvk, xv−k)
[7]. This is because, it is expected that the system parameters
have high correlations with the previous days (the customers
have daily habits, go/come back to/from the work at similar
hours, etc). So, the OMD algorithm uses the information of
the previous scheduling horizons (days) to improve the long-
term performance. Let’s consider the customer k regret after
T days as:
Rgk(T ) :=
T∑
t=1
J tk(x
t
k, x
t
−k)− min
xk∈X˜k
T∑
t=1
J tk(xk, x−k) (15)
In fact, applying such regret-based OMD algorithm provide
a data-base of action-results to the customer k by which the
customer can infer each of his actions results to what cost (how
much regret). This approach can be seen as a way of adding
prior knowledge about the sequence within the paradigm of
online learning [32].
Proposition 1. Iteration (14) converges in the sense that, for
any x∗k ∈ X˜k we have:
Rgk(T ) ≤ 1
ηk
Yk +
ηk
2
T∑
t=1
∥∥∇J tk(xtk, xt−k)−M tk∥∥2∗ (16)
where
Yk := max
xk∈X˜k
Lk(xk)− min
xk∈X˜k
Lk(xk)
Proof. See Proof of Lemma 2 in [33]. In particular, if ηk
is chosen as O(1/
√
T ), then the average regret, namely,
Rgk(T )/T converges to zero as T →∞ [7].
Now, we need to provide a coordinated charging mechanism
between the PEVs to result in a public social optimal solution
to the global problem (11). The main challenge to provide
a fully decentralized solution to (11) is that each customer
k requires to know the aggregate PEVs power consumption∑
k∈K x
h
k = x
h
k +
∑
j∈K/k x
h
j for each slot h ∈ H to solve
(12). A common state of the art solution to this, is that each
PEV submit its action profile to all other PEVs (either directly,
or through the aggregator). According to this mechanism, each
PEV k independently executes the Nash equilibrium regret-
based Algorithm 1 to achieve optimal coordinated charging
(See [34] for optimality and convergence proof). This method
Algorithm 1 Decentralized Nash Equilibrium Strategy
(DNES): executed by each PEV k
1: I. Initialization: Take arbitrary action x0k , M
0
k , and ∇J0k .
2: II. Repeat for t = 1, 2, · · ·
3: Set h = 0, and take parameters of previous day t− 1 as initial values.
4: Repeat according to some order
5: Receive the last update of the other PEVs actions (xtj in j ∈ K/k).
6: Run OMD algorithm (14) and determine xt+1k .
7: If xt+1k changes compared to current schedule, Then, set x
t+1
k as the
new solution and broadcast it.
8: Until convergence
requires very low-latency communication, is not robust to
noise and node/link failures, and jeopardizes the customers’
privacy security. More importantly, for a large power system, it
is probable that some customers, deliberately or inadvertently,
do not communicate with other or do not act rationally. We
can model the noisy data such as the customers are not so
rational and reliable. In this situation the classical games fail
to reach the Nash equilibrium. So, we have used a behavioral
repeated game in this paper. Our game can be modeled as
an infinite game due to the fact that the energy scheduling
must be repeated at each hour or at each day. To tackle this
issue, we present a fully decentralized robust collaborative
method based on the Nash Folk theorem [35]. The original
Folk theorem concerned the payoffs of all the Nash equilibria
of an infinitely repeated game. This theorem helps to identity
the deviator players (PEVs), and punish them with locally
and private message exchange between the neighbors. There
are two kinds of deviations (disruptions) in action or in
communication. If a player either adopt any strategy other
than the provided optimal equilibrium strategy of Algorithm
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1 or sends a spurious information to his neighbors, he is a
deviator. Let’s define the PEV k’s neighborhood Nk as the set
of all PEVs with ability to communicate with PEV k. The key
to characterize a scalable game framework lies in determining
under which conditions can information be diffused through
the grid by the neighbors. In this way, we propose Algorithm
2 considering the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The necessary and sufficient conditions for
a full Nash Folk theorem to hold and to enable deviator
identification by the deviator’s neighbors are as follows:
1) Condition P: For each player k ∈ K, each neighbor
j ∈ Nk, any actions xj , x´j ∈ X˜j , xk ∈ X˜k and
xNk/j ∈ X˜Nk/j , we must have Jk(xk, xj , xNk/j) 6=
Jk(xk, x´j , xNk/j).
2) Condition N: For each player k, for any neighbors j, i ∈
Nk such that j 6= i, there exists ` ∈ Nj/i ∆ Ni/j, such
that there is a path from ` to k which passes through
neither j nor i.
where Nk/j is the set of player k’s neighbors other than
neighbor j with action set X˜Nk/j and action profile xNk/j .
` ∈ Nj/i ∆ Ni/j =
(Nj/{i,Ni}) ∪ (Ni/{j,Nj}) and
implies that player ` is a neighbor of j or i, but not of both.
Condition P implies that the action of a players always affects
his neighbors’ payoffs, so, its behavior is learnable (deviation
is detectable). A 3-connected2 network in which players have
different neighbors, i.e., for any pair (j, i) ∈ N2,Nj/i 6=
Ni/j, satisfies Condition N (see [36] for detailed information
and proof about Proposition 2). In the proposed framework in
Algorithm 2, the payoff of a customer depends only on his
own action and the actions of his neighbors. This algorithm
is robust to (deliberately or inadvertently) disruption in the
sense that it has ability to identify the guilty customers with
the local private information exchange as follows:
Communication protocol CP: Let’s denote by θ = inf{t ≥
1 : ∃k ∈ K s.t. (xtk 6= x∗tk or ∃j ∈ Nk s.t. mtk(j) 6= ∅)},
the first stage at which a player starts deviating, where x∗tk is
the customer k’s equilibrium strategy at stage t and mtk(j) =
{k, · · · , i} means that a deviation report has been sent from
player k to player j at stage t declaring players {k, · · · , i} as
the innocent players. When each customer k ∈ K detects a
deviation (θ 6= ∅), that is, either he observes a change in his
payoff or he receives mtj(k) 6= ∅ from his neighbor, then he
sends the sets of innocent players to his neighbors. This set is
computed as follows:
• If he has observed a change in his payoff (the deviation
is in action), then he clears all the customers that are not
his neighbors. That means, the deviator must be one of
his neighbors. If θ 6= ∅ and he does not observe a change
in his payoff (he has received mtj(k) from some j ∈ Nk),
he clears all his neighbors.
• The set of innocent customers then is updated using the
sets received by his neighbors, i.e., if neighbor j ∈ Nk
sends his set of innocents {j, i,m}, customer k adds
2Graph G with vertex V is called n-connected if |V | ≥ n and G −
X is connected for every set X ⊆ V with |X| < n, where G − X
represents the graph where all nodes in X have been removed (and
the corresponding links). Simply, a graph is n-connected if any two of its
nodes can be joined by n independent paths.
customer i and m to his own set of innocents. Note
that player k cannot clear player j. If j is the deviator,
then i and m are cleared automatically. Otherwise, j is
performing the protocol obediently, so his information is
true and i and m are really innocent. Therefore, by this
mechanism the information “j claims that i and m are
innocent” is not manipulable by player j.
• At the end of the protocol, if at least one customer k ∈ N`
says that customer ` ∈ Nk is not cleared, then customer
` is known as the deviator. Otherwise, there is no action
deviation and deviation is in communication.
The adopted communication protocol is such that, if a
customer deviates in communication but not in action, then
all customers keep playing the equilibrium actions and payoffs
are not affected. Moreover, when there is an action deviation,
only the deviator’s neighbors have to identify him in order to
punish him.
Punishment: The (independent) minmax level of player ` to
be punished by his neighbors is as follows:
v` = min
xN`∈
∏
j∈N` X˜j
max
x`∈X˜`
P`(x`, xN`) (17)
where P`(x`, xN`) = −J`(x`, xN`) and J`(x`, xN`) is obtained
from (12) by replacing
∑
j∈N` x
h
j for
∑
j∈K/` x
h
j .
Algorithm 2 Fully Decentralized Nash Folk Strategy (FD-
NFS): Executed by each PEV k
1: I. Initialization: Take arbitrary action x0k, M0k , and ∇J0k .
2: II. Repeat for t = 1, 2, · · ·
3: Set h = 0, and take parameters of previous day t − 1 as initial
values.
4: Repeat according to some order
5: Action Phase: Receive the last update xtj of each PEV in
neighborhood j ∈ Nk.
6: Run OMD algorithm (14) and determine xt+1k .
7: Communication Phase: If xt+1k changes compared to current
schedule, Then set xt+1k as the new solution and broadcast it to
the neighbors.
8: If no deviation is detected, Then sends a blank message
mt+1k (j) = ∅ to his neighbors j ∈ Nk,
9: Else run the communication protocol CP until the deviator ` is
identified.
10: Punishment Phase: If the deviator ` is neighbor with k, Then
player k plays minmax strategy (17) against his neighbor `.
11: Until convergence
To provide an insight about how the customers interact with
each other and apply the Nash Folk strategy, the block diagram
of the proposed framework is presented in Fig. 1.
Theorem 3. The developed Nash Folk repeated game in
Algorithm 2 converges to an optimal unique solution of global
minimization problem (11) at Nash equilibrium. In the Nash
equilibrium solution, no player can increase his payoff by
switching unilaterally to an alternative strategy.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 1. For improving the short term performance of the
proposed mechanism, we can use an event-triggered MPC
strategy with optimal tuning t and run the repeated game once
needed (e.g., a change is occurred) [30].
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Fig. 1. The block diagram of applying the Nash Folk strategy on the
considered smart micro-grid model.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Simulation Scenarios and System Parameters
In the adopted setup for numerical simulations, we have
considered a smart micro-grid including one aggregator
procuring power for K = 10 customers within scheduling
horizon H = 24 for each h = 1 hour. The baseline price signal
is adopted from the real case day ahead hourly locational
marginal price (LMP) values determined by Pennsylvania-New
Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) electricity market for
2017/08/01 [37]. Each customer has one PEV with ideal
charge/discharge efficiency and their base loads is adopted
randomly with some correlation with the baseline price signal.
The customers’ electric vehicles are assumed to randomly have
different specifications (e.g., 12 ≤ Bcapk = Emaxk ≤ 14 kWh,
Emink = 0, x
r
k = 4 kW/h) and preferences (e.g., Hk). We also
assumed that the initial energy level of all the PEVs is zero
and 12 ≤ Edk ≤ 14 kWh. Without loss of generality, for
the considered system topology (graph), it is assumed that
each customer has three neighbors (e.g., N1 ={3, 4, 5}, N2
={4, 5, 6}, N3 ={1, 5, 6}, N4 ={1, 2, 6}, N5 ={1, 2, 3},
N6 ={2, 3, 4}, N7 ={6, 8, 9}, N8 ={5, 7, 10}, N9 ={2,
7, 10}, N10 ={3, 8, 9}). In the proposed results, PP and
PT denote dynamic price-participant and static price-taker
scenarios, respectively. The grid topology with 3-connected
graph is denoted by 3 and 2-connected graph is denoted by
number 2, and symbol B denotes a communication protocol
in which each customer needs to send his base load to the
neighbors. Further, on/off (continuous) denotes the scenario
in which the PEVs are allowed only to charge/discharge with
fixed (modulated) charging rate, and V2G denotes the scenario
in which the PEVs can sell electricity back to the grid.
B. Performance Comparison
For each of the algorithms (DNES and FDNFS) formulated
in the previous section, the convergence behavior is compared
for different price signals, communication protocols, and grid
topologies in Fig. 2. As seen in this figure, deploying both
of the algorithms with different assumptions the system con-
verges very fast (only one iteration per customer is required)
and result in much lower total grid payment compared with
when there is not any scheduling program. In all the results
the proposed FDNFS is as efficient as the DNES method
(which the dominant method in the literature), while it is
obvious that our novel FDNFS method is more robust, more
reliable, require low communications, and scalable. Also this
results indicate that there is no need for customers to share
their base non-PEV loads (as long as the price signal is well
designed) and they are free to adopt 2, 3, or more neighbors
(as long as the grid topology is a connected graph). As in
the price-participant scenarios, the consumption patterns affect
the price signal, there is some oscillation in the convergence
process around the optimal point. This is because, as much
as the customers shift their PEVs consumption to time slots
with lower prices, the spot price increases at those slots
to prevent creation of sub-peaks [18]. The performance of
the centralized method in the price taking (PT) scenario
shows that the aggregate system payment is the lowest. We
must note that when there is too many customers in the
system, the centralized method is not practical as it imposes
a huge computational burden to the system, the privacy of
the customers are put into danger, and the algorithm is not
reliable and robust to failures. However, in another simulation
scenario with dynamic pricing (Centralized-PP), we can see
that performance of the centralized method is worse than the
decentralized methods. This is because in the decentralized
method, at each iteration the customers update the price
function and effectively can predict the effect of their actions
on the price behavior.
However, according to Fig. 2, when the customers are
assumed to be price-taker, they incur more cost compared
with those by price-participant customers. This is because
when the customers are price-participant, shifting the PEVs’
load to lower price slots helps flatten and lower the price
signal. This behavior is illustrated in Fig. 3. As shown in
Fig. 3(a), without the charge scheduling, the PEVs’ load
demand deteriorates the system performance as results in
higher peak demand. Accordingly, when our method (the
FDNFS algorithm) is deployed, the peak demand is reduced
and the PEVs’ charging profiles is shifted to the time slots with
lower price. This behavior results in a valley filling pattern.
Fig. 3(b) illustrates the deference between dynamic-PP and
static-PT real time pricing. In the case of static pricing, the
customers’ behavior does not affect the price signal. So, the
spot price is coordinated with the baseline price to reduce the
peak demand as much as possible. On the other hand, when
dynamic real time pricing is performed, shifting the PEVs’
demand to low price time slots results in transferring the spot
price to those slots. This behavior has two benefits; preventing
creation sub-peaks in slots with low prices and reducing the
customers’ payments (see Fig. 4).
To make incentive for all the PEV owners to participate
in a scheduling program they must be sure to acquire some
monetary benefit of it. From Fig. 4, we can see that all the
PEV owners can reduce their payments by participating in our
mechanism. As previously mentioned, for all the simulations
the customer’s payment with dynamic-PP pricing is lower than
other scenarios (no schedule and static-PT pricing). Moreover,
it is obvious that by V2G protocol, the customers can charge
their PEVs in low price slots and sell it at high price slots (see
Fig. 5), resulting in minimum possible payment.
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As an example, customer 4’s load pattern in four scenarios
are given in Fig. 5. Two charging models (on/off and contin-
uous) without ability of selling electricity back to the grid are
shown in Fig. 5(a). In both models the customer has charged
his PEV in slots with low base load demand (which coincides
with low price slots). As is clear from Fig. 5(a), in the on/off
charging mode, the PEV is working on only three time slots,
while continuous charging occupies six slots. As we proved in
Appendix B, this result shows that the on/off charging strategy
provides more regulation capacity. The charging profile for
customer 4 under V2G protocol is shown in Fig. 5(b). We
can see that the customer has charged his PEV with more
power than he needs in slots with low prices and sell back the
excess energy in slots with high prices to reduce his payment.
However, due to the frequent charge/discharge battery cycles,
this procedure increases the battery degradation cost (see Fig.
6).
There is always a trade-off between reducing the payment
by frequently charging and discharging the storage devices
and reducing the battery degradation cost by keeping constant
the battery SOC. Comparison between Fig. 4 and Fig. 6
demonstrates this trade-off. The results of Fig. 4 show that
the customers have minimum possible payment with the V2G
protocol. On the other perspective, Figs. 6(a)-(b) illustrate
that the V2G protocol results in maximum possible battery
degradation cost.
The long-term performance of the proposed framework
is analyzed in Figs. 7(a)-(b). The aggregate behavior of 10
customer in the presence of uncertainty about parameters αk,
βk, Edk , and p
h are demonstrated in Fig. 7(a). As we can see,
at time slots with high price (which is mostly incurred by
high base load) all the customers try to discharge the battery
of their PEVs to make profit. They also charge their PEVs
at slots with low price to pay less. However, the most(least)
PEV power charging(discharging) does not exactly coincides
with the lowest(highest) price due to inaccuracy in stochastic
parameters estimation. Moreover, the convergence behavior of
iteration (14) for customer 4 is depicted in Fig. 7(b) by regret
criterion (15). The result denotes that at the first days the regret
level is high, while as the learning capability of the customer
increases, the regret level goes down and converges.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Efficient charging scheduling of PEVs requires robust,
decentralized and incentive-based coordination mechanism.
None of the proposed PEV charging/discharging schedules in
the literature is robust fully decentralized. To address these
concerns, we proposed a computationally efficient “fully”
decentralized game-based charging mechanism coordinated by
a real time dynamic pricing method using the Nash Folk
strategy. Due to the private and local communication between
the neighbors this framework is robust to link/node failures and
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noisy information too. Our pricing and charging schedule takes
into account the PEV’s battery specification and degradation
cost, is completely general, and can work with any scenario
with some manipulation. The MPC and regret matching tech-
niques where used with Bayesian inference and the CVaR
to cope with uncertainties and improve the short/long-term
performance of the mechanism. Further, for the first time, we
illustrated that any cheating by the players or any cyber-attack
can be identified by the proposed framework. We proved that
our method minimizes the load variance and power system
losses, and provides maximum regulation capacity and the
load factor. Finally, we proved and demonstrated by numerical
results that our mechanism works efficiently in different sce-
narios and results in total valley filling profile and minimum
possible payment for the customers.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of four parts. In the fist
part we need to show that an optimal solution of (11) provides
a valley filling load profile. To this end we need following
proposition
Proposition 3. Minimizing an strictly convex global function∑
k∈K U(xk) : R → R results in a valley filling charging
profile
∑
k∈K x
h
k = [A −
∑
k∈K l
h
k ]
+,∀h ∈ H, where [a]+ =
max{0, a} with some A ∈ R.
Proof. In [6], it is proved that a valley-filling charging profile
is optimal (Property 1) and an optimal solution exist, if X =
X1 × · · · × XK 6= ∅, i.e., X is nonempty (Property 2). The
feasible set Xk of each PEV k’s charging profile is obviously
nonempty, compact, and convex. So, the global feasible set is
also nonempty, compact, and convex [31].
Let X , [x1, · · · , xK ]> ∈ RK×H , x = x1 + · · · + xK ∈
R1×H denote the charging profile and the aggregate charging
profile of all the PEVs.
Definition 1. Two feasible charging profiles X and X´ are
equivalent, denoted as X ∼= X´, if their aggregate charging
profiles are the same, i.e., x = x´.
It is inference from Theorem 1 in [6] that for optimization
problem (12), optimal charging profile is in general not unique.
So, let denote the set of optimal charging profiles with an arbi-
trary optimal charging profile Xo as O := {X ∈ X | X ∼= Xo}.
Moreover, it is shown in [6] that the set O of optimal charging
profiles does not depend on the choice of U(X). That means,
if Xo is optimal with respect to a strictly convex U1(X), then
Xo is optimal with respect to any strictly convex Un(X).
Now, we consider an arbitrary valley-filling charging profile
Xv . From property 1 of [6], this charging profile is optimal to
any strictly convex function, specially to (11). As the objective
function of problem 12 and its global objective function (11)
are also strictly convex, each global optimal solution Xo to
(11), is an equivalence class with valley-filling charging profile
Xv . From Definition 1 the aggregate charging profiles of Xv
and Xo are the same. So, we can conclude that the optimal
charging profile Xo generates a valley-filling profile and the
proof of Proposition 3 (the first part of the proof of Theorem
1) is complete.
Next, we proceed to show that an optimal solution of (11)
minimizes the load variance (the second part of the proof
of Theorem 1). Note that as the set O of optimal charging
profiles does not depend on the choice of U(X), without
loss of generality we assume that our objective function is
U(X) =
∑
k∈K
∑
h∈H
(
xhk
)2
. The load variance seen at the
retailer side is defined as follows:
σ2 , 1
H
∑
h∈H
(Xh − Lavg)2, Lavg = 1
H
∑
k∈K
∑
h∈H
(xhk − lhk)
(18)
where Xh =
∑
k∈K x
h
k is the aggregate PEVs’ load at slot h.
Function (18) can be expanded as follows:
σ2 , 1
H
∑
h∈H
(Xh)2− 2Lavg 1
H
∑
h∈H
Xh +
1
H
∑
h∈H
L2avg (19)
where the second term must be constant (equal to∑
k∈KE
d
k/(ηkB
cap
k )) due to constraint (2). Since Lavg is con-
stant, the last term is constant likewise. Therefore, minimizing
the load variance is equivalent to minimizing the first term of
(19), i.e., our objective function
∑
h∈H
(
Xh
)2
. So, the optimal
charge profiles which minimize our global problem (11), result
in the minimum load variance.
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In the third part of the proof of Theorem 1, we need
to show that an optimal solution of (11) minimizes the the
power system losses. According to the Theorem 2 in [3], for a
fixed energy demand in scheduling horizon H , minimizing the
feeder energy losses is equivalent to minimizing load variance
if the feeder is a single branch with small voltage fluctuations,
which completes the third part of the proof of Theorem 1.
Finally, we proceed to fourth part of the proof of Theorem
1. As the PEV consume much power, in Section II-B, we
assumed that the PEVs penetration into the future power
system is large enough to affect the spot electricity price. So,
it is reasonable to assume that
∑
k∈KE
d
k/(ηkB
cap
k ) is larger
enough compared with
∑
k∈K
∑
h∈H l
h
k . Let Im,b, V denote
maximum current of the aggregate base loads and the system
voltage, respectively. According to the Theorem 3 in [3], if∑
k∈K
∑
h∈H(x
h
k + l
h
k) ≥ Im,bV T hold, minimizing the load
variance is equivalent to maximizing the load factor and the
proof of Theorem 1 is complete.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
A vehicle is considered to provide regulation service and
can make profit when being idle. So, the more the PEV is in
idle mode, the more it can provide the regulation capacity. On
the other hand, when a vehicle is charging, it has to pay for
purchasing the power from the grid. Thus, the profit acquired
by PEV owner k ∈ K is defined as follows (for simplicity and
without loss of generality we do not consider the degradation
cost and we drop subscript k from the following notations):
G(Hc, rh) ,
∑
h∈(H−Hc)
PhR − xmax
∑
h∈Hc
Phrh (20)
where Hc is the set of time slots in which PEV k is in
charging mode, PhR is the regulation price payed to the PEV
for providing the regulation capacity at slot h, xmax is the
maximum possible charging rate, and 0 ≤ rh ≤ 1 is the
charging rate. Rewriting the above equation with respect to
the control variables rh and Ph yields:
G(Hc, rh) ,
∑
h∈H
PhR −
∑
h∈Hc
(
Phrhxmax + PhR
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(rh)
(21)
where the first term is constant and PhR, Ph are given by the
aggregator. So, to maximize the profit we need minimize the
second term (H(rh)) of (21). Let’s assume that there exist
optimal rh1 and r
h
2 such that 0 < r
h
1 , r
h
2 < 1. It follows then
that we have:
H(rh1 ) +H(r
h
2 ) = Ph1 rh1xmax + PhR,1 + Ph2 rh2xmax + PhR,2
= rh1 (Ph1 − Ph2 ) +DPh2 + PhR,1 + PhR,2
(22)
As we seek to determine a charging rate which results in the
maximum regulation capacity, we can assume D = rh1 + r
h
2
to be constant. Therefore, (22) becomes a first-order equation
with respect to rh1 and the extrema occur only at both ends
of the range of rh1 . That is, (22) has a minimum at either of
rh1 = 0 or r
h
1 = 1 from (21), which contradicts the assumption
that 0 < rh1 , r
h
2 < 1. Therefore, r
h is unique and should be
either 0 or 1 to minimize H(rh). Since we assumed that PhR,
Ph are known (given by the aggregator), minimizing H(rh)
results in minimizing Hc and consequently maximize the time
slots in which the PEV is in idle mode.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
As our objective function fk(xk) is strictly convex, each
payoff function Pk(xk, x−k) is strictly concave with respect
to xk [31]. Therefore, game Γ(K, xk, Pk(xk, x−k)) is a strictly
concave K-person game [38]. Accordingly, the existence of
a Nash equilibrium directly results from Theorem 1 and the
uniqueness of this equilibrium from Theorem 2 of [39]. This
unique Nash equilibrium of considered game is the optimal
solution of global minimization problem (11) according to
Theorem 2 of [34]. So, the actions determined by Algorithm
2 are feasible and strictly individually rational payoff. For any
payoff function which satisfy condition P, the necessary and
sufficient condition on the network for a Nash Folk theorem
to hold is satisfying condition N (see proof of Theorem 2.12
in [36]). Our payoff function P (xk, x−k) satisfy condition P
(Jk(xk, x−k) is strictly monotone with respect to its arguments
[31]). Therefore, by considering a topology with satisfy con-
dition N, our framework will be converging to a full Nash
Folk theorem, i.e. conditions under which all feasible, strictly
individually rational payoffs are Nash equilibrium payoffs in
a repeated game with patient players.
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